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An accumulation of research evidence indicates that hate crimes as a category of offence are more 
serious than similar but otherwise motivated crimes in respect of the greater post-victimization 
distress reported by victims. Such evidence has been used by advocates of hate crime laws to justify 
the imposition of greater penalties in the sentencing of convicted hate crime offenders. However, in 
focusing on the commonalities of the greater level of post-victimization impacts experienced by hate 
crime victims as a group, the research evidence to date has obscured the diversity of reactions 
between victims. Consequently, this article expands the evidence in new directions by illuminating the 
variation in reported victim impacts. The analysis presented uses data from the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales on reported racially motivated crime and reveals that not all victims report being 
emotionally affected by hate crime, not all victims are affected the same way, and some victims of 
racially motivated crime report less of an emotional impact than some victims of equivalent but 
otherwise motivated crimes. The research findings are used to reason that in any individual case of 
hate crime the motivating sentiments of the offender provide an unreliable indicator of the harms 
inflicted upon the victim.  Therefore a blanket uplift in penalty in every case of hate crime which rests 
upon the offender’s mental state— their prejudice, bigotry, bias, or ‘hate’ — cannot be justified if the 
justification for sentence uplift is to give offenders their just deserts for the harms they inflict. Instead, 
the justification must rest upon the culpability of the offender for the harms they may or may not 
actually inflict. Just as there is variation in victim impacts, there will be variation in offender 
culpability: discretion and flexibility in the mode of enhanced sentencing is therefore necessary to 
ensure justice for offenders as well as victims.  
  




Introduction: the hate debate 
In arguments that have been long rehearsed, critics of hate crimes laws in the United States have 
argued that the additional punishment of hate crime offenders over and above the punishment that can 
be meted out for a similar, but otherwise motivated crime, amounts to the state criminalizing the 
expression of certain thoughts, opinions and values (cf. Bruce 2001; Gey 1997; Hurd 2001) as it is 
such aspects of the offender’s mind that distinguishes a hate crime from a parallel crime. Against this 
argument, though, supporters of hate crime laws have contended that it is not the bad values or the 
motivation of the offender (perhaps expressed in things they say while committing the offence) that 
are being punished. Instead, they propose that the laws impose greater punishment for the greater 
harms inflicted by hate crimes. The harms most commonly claimed concern the experience of 
psychological and emotional trauma by victims following a hate crime (cf. Lawrence 1999 & 2006), 
and also trauma vicariously experienced by those who share the same identity as the primary victim. 
Accordingly, enhanced sentencing of convicted hate crime offenders simply gives the offenders the 
just deserts for the harms they inflict. To use the words of Hurd and Moore (2004) on the matter, who 
cast this argument as the ‘wrongdoing analysis’, the conclusions drawn from the empirical claims 
about the greater harms inflicted by hate crime are that: 
“…hate/bias crime offenders deserve more punishment because they are more 
blameworthy; that they are more blameworthy because they have done greater wrong; 
and that they have done greater wrong because they have (typically) caused more harm, 
namely, the psychological traumatization of victims.” (Hurd & Moore 2004, p. 1087) 
Although Hurd and Moore focussed on the limitations of the empirical claims behind the ‘wrongdoing 
analysis’, an accumulating body of evidence does now demonstrate that as a group victims of ‘hate 
crime’ collectively experience a greater degree of negative psychological impacts when compared 
with victims of parallel crimes. 
 
In drawing from a review of some of the evidence, Craig-Henderson and Sloan posited that the range 
of negative emotions experienced by victims of racist crime are “qualitatively distinct” from the 
emotions experienced by victims of parallel crimes (2003, p. 482). The consequences for the 




individual victim of this qualitative difference in hate crime are manifest in symptoms of post-
victimization distress. Quantitative differences between hate crime victims and victims of parallel 
crimes in experiencing such symptoms have also been illuminated by a number of research studies — 
at first in the United States, and more recently in the United Kingdom. Initially, generalizing the 
findings of this evidence was limited by the use of small samples of victims of hate crimes and 
comparison crimes (cf. Garofalo 1997) and non-random samples (cf. Herek, Gillis, Cogan & Glunt 
1997; McDevitt et al., 2001). Such limitations have now been overcome by the use of large random 
samples in the secondary analysis of crime victimisation survey data (cf. Iganski 2008; Smith et al., 
2012) as is the case with the analysis to be presented in this paper. Overall, the evidence shows that 
while hate crime victims experience and report the same types of stress and trauma symptoms as 
victims of parallel crimes, comparisons of samples of hate crime victims and victims of comparison 
crimes have shown that hate crime victims are more likely to report: 
 That they were “very much” emotionally affected (Smith et al., 2012, p. 22), that they “rate 
their crimes as very serious”, and “that the crimes had a ‘great deal’ of effect on their lives in 
both the short term and long term” (Garofalo 1997, p. 141); 
 Having a stronger emotional reaction even when controlling for crime type (Botcherby et al., 
2011; Iganski 2008); 
 Having a greater propensity to have unwanted intrusive thoughts about the incident and to 
“feel like not wanting to live any longer…” (McDevitt et al., 2001, p. 709); 
 Having a longer period of recovery from the effects of victimisation (Herek, Gillis, Cogan & 
Glunt 1997) and that overcoming the incident “had been very difficult” (McDevitt et al., 
2001, p. 711); 
  That “being ‘frightened or scared’ was the primary response in the immediate aftermath of 
the crime”, (while less likely to report “being ‘angry or mad’ as their predominant response”) 
(Garofalo 1997, p. 141); 
Furthermore, in terms of specific symptoms of distress, compared with victims of parallel crimes, 
victims of hate crime are more likely to report experiencing: 




 Higher levels depression (McDevitt et al., 2001) and withdrawal (Ehrlich 1992); 
 Anxiety (Ehrlich 1992) and nervousness (McDevitt et al., 2001); 
 Loss of confidence (Ehrlich 1992);  
 Anger (Herek, Gillis, Cogan & Glunt 1997); 
 Increased sleep difficulties (Ehrlich 1992); 
 Difficulty concentrating (McDevitt et al., 2001); 
 Fear and reduced feelings of safety (McDevitt et al., 2001); 
These characteristics of post-victimization distress have also been illuminated in  depth by a number 
of studies which have focused solely on hate crime  victims without comparison samples of victims of 
parallel crimes (cf. Barnes & Ephross 1994; Dzelme 2008; Hershberger & D’Augelli 1995; Otis & 
Skinner 1996; Victim Support 2006).  
 
In sum, as a body of evidence, these research findings support the hypothesis that hate crimes hurt 
more than parallel crimes in respect of the experience of post victimization distress. However, in 
illuminating the commonality of impacts and the greater severity of stress and trauma symptoms 
experienced by ‘hate crime’ victims as a group, the research literature on the matter to date has in 
general obscured the diversity of the experience of impacts among hate crime victims. There have 
been just a few exceptions to this trend. Craig-Henderson and Sloan (2003) have argued for instance, 
that the unique reaction by hate crime victims is due to their perception of their experience of 
victimization as an attack upon the core of their identity. Because of this, black minority victims of 
racist crime will experience the crime more acutely than white majority group victims because the 
crime serves as a painful reminder of the cultural heritage of past and ongoing discrimination, 
stereotyping and stigmatization of their identity group: “When an anti-black racist hate crime occurs it 
brings all of the dormant feelings of anger, fear and pain to the collective psychological forefront of 
the victim. This is not the case when whites are the target of racist hate crime” (Craig-Henderson & 
Sloan, 2003, p. 485). More recently, in employing an intersectional approach to examine how a 
sample of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people evaluated the severity of their experiences of 




hate crime, Meyer’s (2010) findings from his study involving semi-structured interviews with a non-
random sample of forty-four respondents in New York City suggested that middle-class white 
respondents were more likely than low-income respondents of color to perceive their experiences as 
severe. This was chiefly because of differing expectations between the groups of the likelihood of 
hate crime victimization based on different reference groups victims used to interpret their experience. 
This article expands the research evidence even further by exploring the differential impacts of racist 
victimization as moderated and mediated by particular demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of respondents (in other words, an ‘intersectional approach’) and also by type and 
frequency of crime victimization. 
 
Research design and sample 
The research involved a secondary analysis of data collected by the Crime Survey for England and 
Wales (formerly known as the British Crime Survey, but renamed from April 2012 to better reflect its 
geographic coverage) and obtained from the UK Data Archive
1
. The Crime Survey for England and 
Wales interviews approximately 46,000 respondents (aged 16 and over) every year. The survey is 
generally regarded as providing a more complete measure of crime compared with police records 
given that not all victims report crimes to the police for a well-known variety of reasons. The aim of 
the analysis reported here was to explore diversity among victims of racist crime in their experience 
of post victimization psychological impacts.  
 
It is the preferred practice, in the reporting of the survey findings by the U.K. Home Office which 
initiated and reports on the survey, for two years of data to be combined to give a sufficient sample 
size for fine-grained analysis without a too prolonged reference period. However, given that the 
analysis that was undertaken was concerned with within-group differences of the survey sample of 
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victims of racist crime, rather than with generalizing beyond the sample to the wider population about 
the incidence or prevalence of crime, consideration of the reference period is not as significant. Hence 
the analysis combined three sweeps of the survey — from the 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 surveys 
(the three most recent data sets at the time of writing) — to enable sufficient sample sizes for logistic 
regression analyses. 
 
All respondents in the survey are asked whether they experienced certain types of crimes in the 
previous twelve months. Usually, just over one-fifth report being a victim of crime at least once. In its 
estimates of crime based on the Crime Survey for England and Wales the U.K. Home Office usually 
excludes reported threats captured by the survey because such incidents do not always meet the 
criteria of a criminal offence despite being assigned valid offence codes in the survey. However, given 
that public order offences such as threats constitute a substantial proportion of prosecuted racially 
aggravated offences in England and Wales the exclusion of threats from the analysis skews the 
reported picture of racist victimization. Threats are therefore included in the analyses presented in this 
paper. 
 
For each crime they report in the survey, respondents are asked an array of questions. One of the 
questions is: “Do you think the incident was racially motivated?” (In relying upon the victim’s 
perception about motivation behind the crime this question is susceptible to over-reporting because 
some crimes perceived by the victim to have been racially motivated could have been motivated by 
other reasons. By the same token, though, it is also susceptible to under-reporting because in some 
crimes victims might not be aware that they were targeted because of their ‘race’ or ethnicity). While 
respondents from each ethnic group reported some racially motivated crimes, minority ethnic group 
respondents were more likely than whites to report such crimes (Table 1) (survey respondents are 
asked to identify their ethnic group from a list of ethnic group categories used in the 2001 and 2011 
U.K. censuses).  Overall, just over one-in-fifty crimes captured by the survey were perceived by 
victims to have been racially motivated. However, the reported rate of racist crime victimization for 
minority groups was much higher: one-in-seven crimes experienced by Asian respondents, for 




instance, were believed by them to have been racially motivated, compared with just over one in a 
hundred for whites. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Racist language used by the offender was the most common reported indicator for respondents that an 
incident was racially motivated, along with the victim suggesting that they had been targeted because 
of their ‘race’ or country of origin (Table 2).  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
The core of the analysis reported in this paper was applied to the 441 incidents of crime believed by 
victims to have been racially motivated and reported by 398 respondents across the three sweeps of 
the survey used for the analysis (a number of respondents reported more than one discrete separate 
racially motivated crime and therefore completed more than one victim form, hence the difference 
between the number of incidents of crime and the number of victims. Victims of a series of related 
racially motivated crimes, the same crime under the same circumstances probably committed by the 
same people, are asked to complete only one victimization module for the most recent incident in the 
series).  
 
How ‘hate’ hurts in different ways: evidence from the Crime Survey for England and Wales 
To set the context for the results of the analysis to be reported, it is instructive to briefly review the 
major characteristics of the sample of victims of racially motivated crime, and the sample of incidents 
of racially motivated crime used in the analysis, in comparison to otherwise motivated crime reported 
in the survey. To take victims first, when comparing victims of racially motivated with otherwise 
motivated crimes (Table 3) victims of racially motivated crime were more likely to be in a younger 
age group, from a minority ethnic group, in a household with a low household income, and to be 
unemployed.  





(Table 3 about here) 
 
Statistically significant differences are evident for all these categories of respondents when comparing 
racially motivated crimes with otherwise motivated crimes. The apparent greater likelihood for males 
to be victims of racially motivated crime than otherwise motivated crime is just below, but on the 
margins of, statistical significance (Z= 1.89). 
 
To turn to the crimes, when comparing incidents of racially motivated and otherwise motivated crime 
(Table 4), it is evident that racially motivated crimes were more likely to involve interpersonal 
offences of violence with and without injury, and threats, and be part of a series of repeat 
victimization. As a group, victims in incidents of racially motivated crime were more likely to report 
that they had an emotional reaction following the incident and the differential between victims of 
racially motivated crime as a group and victims of parallel crime as a group widens further when the 
extent of the reported emotional reaction is considered. Victims of crimes perceived to be racially 
motivated were twice as likely as victims of otherwise motivated crimes to state that they had been 
affected “very much”. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
The data therefore support the assertion that victims of racially motivated crime — as a group — 
experience greater negative impacts than victims of otherwise motivated crime. However, it is also 
apparent that not all victims of racially motivated and otherwise motivated crime report being 
emotionally affected, or report the same post-victimization effects.  In the case of the latter, those 
victims who report having an emotional reaction are asked for every crime they report, “Which of 
these reactions did you personally have?” and are given a list of ten options (anger, annoyance, 
anxiety/panic attacks, crying/tears, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence/feeling 
vulnerable, shock, and other) from which they can choose as many as apply. For each type of 




emotional reaction higher proportions of victims in crimes they believed to be racially motivated 
reported the symptoms, apart from the reaction of “annoyance”, when compared with victims of 
parallel crimes. 
 
The pattern of difference that can be observed, however, obscures variations in emotional reaction 
among victims of racist hate crime. First, in just under one in ten incidents, victims reported 
experiencing no emotional reaction. On this measure then, they were less affected than those victims 
of parallel crimes who did report having an emotional reaction. Second, the different emotional 
reactions comprising the list for multiple selection by respondents might be grouped into three 
separate categories of reaction: externalized reactions, internalized reactions, and a third group which 
combines both externalized and internalized reactions. Anger and annoyance can be considered to be 
externalized reactions. Anger is a natural response, a basic human reaction when a person feels 
wronged, or when they have been threatened or attacked. It can be manifest in feelings of retaliation, 
rage, revenge and aggression towards the source of the wrong doing (we include annoyance as a 
similar type of natural response). One quarter of the victims who perceived incidents of crime to be 
racially motivated who reported having an emotional reaction reported solely such an externalised 
reaction of anger, or annoyance, or both. By contrast, anxiety and panic attacks, crying and tears, 
depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence and feelings of vulnerability, and shock, are 
arguably all symptoms of hurt turned within the person who has been wronged (or internalized) rather 
than against the wrong doer. Almost one-in-five victims of crimes perceived to have been racially 
motivated reported such an internalized reaction, almost twice the proportion for victims of otherwise 
motivated crimes. 
 
Anger and annoyance can sometimes be positive responses when such emotions provide a force for 
change or activism against the source of the wrong doing. But they can also be destructive emotions 
when internalized, perhaps due to the person’s inability to redress or overcome the wrong inflicted, 
and they can become linked to other internalized reactions, especially in the long term. Hence a third 
category of emotional reactions can be established combining both externalized and internalized 




reactions for those respondents who reported both types of reaction. This was the largest category of 
emotional reaction with almost half (47.3%) of victims of crimes perceived to have been racially 
motivated reporting a syndrome of both externalised and internalized reactions compared with under a 
third (29.4%) of victims of parallel crimes. 
 
Although the data indicate that hate crimes hurt more in the respect that as a victim group, victims of 
racially motivated crime are more likely to report experiencing an emotional reaction to the crime 
compared with victims of parallel crimes, and they are more likely to experience internalized 
reactions, or a combination of externalized and internalized reactions, it is clear that not all victims 
react in the same way. Logistic regression was used to estimate how much the risk of experiencing the 
different types of post victimization reactions is increased or reduced according to demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of victims and type and frequency of crime victimization. The aim of 
the logistic regression analysis was to explore the association between victim and victimization 
characteristics and the risk of experiencing the particular emotional reactions while controlling for the 
characteristics of the variables included in the analysis, rather than producing a model of best fit (as 
the purpose of the analysis was to expand understanding of the variation in impacts of hate crime 
upon victims rather than seeking to fully model an account for that diversity). The sub-sample of 
respondents who reported having no emotional reaction after experiencing a crime they perceived as 
being racially motivated was too small to undertake further analysis for all the variables of interest 
therefore the findings reported here are concerned with the three categories of reaction: externalized 
reactions, internalized reactions, and the syndrome of symptoms of both externalized and internalized 
reactions. The analysis showed some clear associations between victim and victimization 
characteristics and the risk of experiencing particular types of emotional reaction. The observations 
here are confined to those findings that were statistically significant (p ˂ 0.05). A summary of the 
significant associations is provided in Table 5. 
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 




Externalized reactions alone 
The odds of reporting the externalised reactions of only anger or annoyance or both (Table 6) were 
over three times greater for male victims of crime compared with female victims. Young people in the 
16-29 age group had higher odds than the older age groups in reporting such externalised reactions 
alone. The odds of reporting externalized reactions were greater for white victims compared with non-
white victims. When considering the type of crime, the odds of reporting externalized reactions were 
significantly greater for victims in incidents of property crime compared with incidents of personal 
crime or threats. And the odds of reporting externalized reactions alone were also significantly greater 
for victims who had experienced single separate incidents of crime compared with victims who had 
experienced a series of incidents or those who had experienced two or more separate and unrelated 
incidents. 
 
Internalized reactions alone 
When examining reported reactions of the internalized symptoms alone — anxiety and panic attacks, 
crying and tears, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss of confidence and feelings of vulnerability, 
and shock — much of the pattern is the mirror opposite of the pattern for externalized symptoms of 
anger and annoyance in that female victims of incidents of racially motivated crime had over twice 
the odds of reporting internalized symptoms alone compared with male victims. The mid-age category 
of 30-59 had the greatest odds of reporting internalized symptoms. And the odds for victims in 
incidents of personal crime involving violence or threats for reporting internalized symptoms alone 
were greater when compared with victims of incidents of property crime.  
 
Syndrome of symptoms of both externalized and internalized reactions 
The odds of reporting both externalized and internalized symptoms combined were greater for female 
victims compared with males,  for non-white victims compared with whites, victims in the youngest 
age category 16-29 compared with the other age groups,  victims in the lowest household income 
category, and victims of a series of incidents.  
 




Implications for just outcomes for offenders 
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that as a group, victims of racist crime collectively 
experience greater emotional and psychological harms compared with victims of parallel crimes. The 
same appears to be the case for other groups of hate crime victims. Analysis of CSEW data has shown 
that disabled victims of hate crime as a group also report more damaging post-victimization 
psychological impacts than victims of parallel crimes (Coleman et al., 2013; Nocon et al., 2011) and 
the same is the case when victims of different types of identity-based crime are considered as one 
aggregate group (Botcherby et al., 2011; Iganski & Lagou 2014; Smith et al., 2012). The greater 
psychological and emotional damage is arguably inflicted by the message sent by the offender, by the 
sentiments conveyed by their crime: it is the offender’s expressed values that appear to hurt. Frederick 
Lawrence has argued that victims of ‘race-hate crime’ experience attacks as a form of racial 
stigmatisation and that an incident “carries with it the clear message that the target and his (sic) group 
are of marginal value” (Lawrence, 2006: 3). In essence, it is the values of the attacker striking at the 
core of the victim’s identity, which hurt more. However, advocates of enhanced sentencing in cases of 
hate crime do not argue that the offender should be punished more severely for their bad character as 
manifest in the values expressed in their crime. Neither, and consistent with the application of 
criminal sanction in the liberal polity (Jacobs 2013), do they propose that the enhanced sentence 
should serve to require virtuous character beyond encouraging critical reflection by the offender about 
how the expression of their particular values is consistent with participation in civil society. Instead, 
in applying the principle of retributive desert, they simply propose that the severity of the punishment 
should be proportionate to the severity of the criminal conduct. From this desert perspective, the 
imposition of more or less criminal sanction than the severity of the criminal conduct would be unfair 
(von Hirsch, 1998: 172). If bad values, or bad character, are excluded from the calculation of severity, 
criminal sanction should be determined by the relative harmful outcomes inflicted. Yet the evidence 
presented in this paper of the disparate outcomes in the post-victimization impacts experienced by 
hate crime victims raises a problem for the just sentencing of offenders if an indiscriminate uplift in 
penalty would be applied in all cases. Fundamentally, in taking the analysis beyond the type of 
findings about the mental trauma of hate crime that have already been published to date, the evidence 




presented in this paper demonstrates that there is considerable variation among victims of racist crime 
when it comes to their reported reactions. It is evident that not all victims react the same way, and 
some victims of racially motivated crime report less post-victimization distress than some victims of 
parallel crimes. The analysis shows therefore that victims of racially motivated crime are not a 
homogeneous group in terms of the emotional impact of the crimes (and neither are victims of parallel 
crimes for that matter). Although the evidence has yet to be established, given the already known 
similarities between different identity groups of hate crime victims in terms of the post-victimization 
trauma they experience, it is likely that there will also be considerable variation in the impacts felt 
among victims who are targeted because of their religion, sexual identity, or a disability they might 
have, for instance. This lack of uniformity in the impacts of hate crimes upon victims exposes a 
potential problem of justice in sentencing outcomes for offenders. Arguably, to justify a blanket uplift 
in penalty, every victim of hate crime must experience greater harms than every victim of parallel 
crime. The analysis presented in this paper shows that this is certainly not the case. If an 
indiscriminate penalty uplift would be applied, some hate crime offenders would potentially receive a 
higher sentence on the basis of the greater harms they are assumed to inflict even in instances where 
their victims experience less harm than victims in some cases of otherwise motivated but equivalent 
crimes where the offenders will receive lower penalties. The logical process for fair sentencing then, 
to avoid potential injustice for the offender, would arguably be for the victim impact to be 
demonstrated on a case-by-case basis to the satisfaction of the court that the impact of the hate crime 
on the victim is greater than would be the case in a parallel crime. Without evidence of the gravity of 
the hurts experienced by the victim to enable a calculation to be made of what proportionate sentence 
should fairly be imposed upon the offender, injustice will potentially prevail. Injustice will also 
prevail if in the absence of evidence of the nature and gravity of the impact the motivating sentiments 
of the offender are simply used as a proxy for the victim impact given that the variation in reported 
post-victimization distress among victims demonstrated by the analysis in this paper indicates that the 
motivating impulses of the offender serves as an unreliable proxy for the harmful outcomes inflicted. 
 




There are two potential solutions to this problem, but neither is satisfactory. First, it might be argued 
that to avoid injustice for offenders, discretion and flexibility in sentencing is necessary, with penalty 
enhancement applied only on a case-by-case basis where it is demonstrated that the impact of the hate 
crime is greater than would be the case in a parallel crime. The problem with this approach, however, 
is that it could compound the injustice already experienced by victims by further traumatizing them 
through the requirement to relive and recount their felt consequences of victimisation in the pursuit of 
justice for the offender. Second, it might be argued that a hate crime not only hurts the individual 
victim targeted as potentially each hate crime has many victims in respect of the vicarious, or 
terroristic, impacts they can have upon targeted communities (Iganski 2001), and such impacts could 
be used to determine sentencing. As is the case for the harmful outcomes experienced by the 
individual hate crime victim, it could be reasoned that for the just treatment of offenders in respect of 
determining their sentences, evidence of any such vicarious impacts must be clearly understood and 
presented to the court. This would conveniently avoid the problem of further victimisation for the 
primary victim who could be absolved from unfolding their own suffering before the court. However, 
to date, evidence about the vicarious impacts of hate crime stands little more than assertion as scholars 
have so far not convincingly demonstrated such impacts, apart from some small scale qualitative 
(Noelle 2001 & 2009) and non-generalizable research findings (Perry & Alvi 2012). There is little 
prospect at the moment then for reliable evidence about the vicarious impacts of hate crime to be 
brought before the courts, or to reliably inform the understanding of the courts to inform sentencing. 
Furthermore, it is likely that when such evidence might be produced reliably there is likely to be as 
much variation in the vicarious impacts as there is in the impacts experienced by individual victims. 
 
A way forward in adhering to the principle of retributive desert in the sentencing of hate crime 
offenders in light of the evidence of the disparate impacts of hate crime provided in this paper, is to 
step beyond the concern with the actual harmful outcomes of offenders’ actions to focus instead on 
the culpability of offenders for unleashing risks of harms (Alexander 2011) irrespective of the harmful 
outcomes that actually occur. Given that the evidence that hate crime as a category of crime inflicts 
greater harm than otherwise motivated crime is now well established, the culpability of the offender 




can be the primary consideration in deciding sentencing outcomes, not the actual harmful outcomes 
inflicted. To illustrate this, four different offender types might be distinguished with two different 
sentencing outcomes. The first type, the successful instrumental bigot, is fully cognizant of the risks 
of their actions and intends to inflict particular hurts which are in actuality suffered by the victim.  
The second type, the unsuccessful committed bigot, is also fully cognizant of the risks of their actions 
and also intends to inflict particular hurts. However, in this case the victim has the resilience or some 
other good fortune not to suffer the intended hurts. The disposal of both of these offenders should be 
exactly the same as it would be unfair for the second offender to benefit from the good fortune of 
targeting a resilient victim when they fully intended to inflict hurts upon them. In both cases the same 
enhanced penalty proportionate to the risks unleashed, but not necessarily inflicted, would be just in 
terms of the principle of retributive desert. It is likely, however, that such offenders will be in a small 
minority as most offenders will not be committed bigots or fully aware of the depth of risk of their 
actions given that most people will not be inclined to consult the scholarly evidence of the type cited 
in this paper of the particular hurts inflicted by acts of hate crime. There is a third type of offender 
then, the unfortunate expressive bigot, who intends to inflict some hurt, perhaps in an emotional 
outburst in the heat of the moment, or perhaps to have a laugh at the other person’s expense, or 
perhaps to go along and get along with friends, but who is not aware of the full depth of hurt they 
inflict upon their victim. Rather than an enhanced penalty, and in keeping with the growing repertoire 
of sentencing practices (Tonry, 2006), a rehabilitative (Iganski et al., 2011) or some other form of 
therapeutic  intervention aimed at helping the offender manage their emotions in situations of 
heightened stress and to also begin to address the personal and social contexts for their offending will 
be more appropriate and just. As too will helping the offender to appreciate the full impact of their 
actions, perhaps involving reparation as well as retribution with a restorative justice component 
(Shenk, 2001; Walters & Hoyle, 2010; Gavrielides, 2012; Walters, 2014) or some other form of 
community mediation (Iganski et al., 2014), would be more appropriate, and more just, for the 
enhanced element of the sentence over and above the sentence for the predicate offense. The same 
would apply to a fourth type of offender, the fortunate expressive bigot, who also intends to inflict 
some hurt, but is not aware of the full depth of hurt they could have inflicted upon their victim had 




they been less resilient. An intervention with such an offender which seeks to raise their empathy for 
the victim, so that they might think twice before acting the same way again, would be more just in 
light of their lesser culpability than the infliction of added deprivation. 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence is now well established that hate crimes as a category of offence are more serious than 
similar but otherwise motivated crimes in respect of the greater post-victimization distress 
experienced by victims. However, the research evidence to date has obscured the diversity of impacts 
experienced by victims. This paper has taken the evidence in a new direction by presenting data to 
illuminate the variation in reported victim impacts. Such variation raises potential problems, however, 
for retributive desert justifications of enhanced penalties for hate crime offenders. If penalties are to 
be fairly proportionate to the harms inflicted they would need to be decided on a case-by-case basis 
with the evidence of the harms inflicted brought before the courts. Such an approach would mitigate 
against any blanket sentence enhancement in the case of hate crime over and above the predicate 
offense. The culpability of the offender, however, for unleashing the risk of harm irrespective of the 
actual harm that occurs, can fairly serve to inform sentence enhancement. Irrespective of the outcome 
of their actions, different offenders will have different awareness of the full depth of harm they might 
inflict and different intent to inflict such harms. Flexibility in sentencing, with rehabilitative and 
reparative dimensions for those with lesser culpability is therefore appropriate. 
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Table 1   Proportions of incidents of crime perceived to be racially motivated, by ethnic 
group 
Row percentages             England & Wales, adults aged 16 and over 
 
                                                                        % of incidents  Unweighted base 
 
ALL INCIDENTS         2.3     35521 
Ethnic group 
White           1.2     32450 
Mixed         *5.8         393 
Asian or Asian British     *14.3       1445 
Black or Black British       *6.1         785 
Chinese or other      *12.7         448 
All minority ethnic groups     *11.1       3071 
 
Source: Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 
Variables: racemot (recoded to exclude ‘don’t know’/refused), ethgrp2 
*p ˂ 0.05 
 
  




Table 2   Indicators of perceived racial motivation of crimes 
Column percentages                                     England and Wales, adults aged 16 and over 
 
        % of incidents                                                                                   
 
ALL INCIDENTS BELIEVED TO BE RACIALLY MOTIVATED    
Because of victim’s race/country of origin    49.4 
Racist language used       49.0    
Because of offender’s race/country of origin    18.1  
Because it has happened before      18.1 
Because some people pick on minorities       9.5      
Because offence only committed against minorities     8.3     
Other         11.1 
Don’t Know          0.4 
Unweighted base        441 
 
Source: Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 
Variables: yracemoa – yracemoi, racemot (recoded to exclude ‘don’t know’/refused) 
  




Table 3. Characteristics of victims of racially motivated crimes compared with victims of 
otherwise motivated crimes  





Victims of racially 
motivated crime 
 
Sex   
Male 51.1 *57.9 
Female 48.9 *42.1 
Unweighted base 27159 398 
Age   
16-29 32.8 *39.1 
30-59 53.1  54.6  
60+ 14.2  *6.2 
Unweighted base 27159 398 
Ethnic group   
White 88.7                 *43.9 
Non-white 11.3                 *56.1 
Unweighted base 27112 396 
Total household income   
Less than £20.000 24.3 *35.9 
£20.000-£39.999 24.3   22.8 
£40.000 or more 28.8 *16.9 
Not stated/not enough info 22.6   24.4 
Unweighted base 27125 397 






status   
Employed 67.4   *61.6 
Unemployed   4.8    *9.4 
Economically inactive 27.8    29.0 
Unweighted base 27069 396 
 
 
Source: Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 
Variables: sex, agegrp, ethgrp3, tothhin3 (recoded), remploy, racemot (recoded to exclude ‘Don’t 
know’/refused) 
*p ˂ 0.05 
  




Table 4. Characteristics of incidents of racially motivated crime compared with incidents 
of otherwise motivated crime 








Offence type   
Burglary/theft 41.7   *7.6 
Criminal damage  19.5  15.7 
Violence with injury   9.9  11.7 
Violence without injury   8.7              *25.1 
Other theft/attempted theft from the person   5.2  *0.9 
Threats             15.0              *38.9 
Unweighted base 35147 441 
Summary offence type   
Property crimes 61.2 *23.3 
Personal crimes of violence and theft/attempted 
theft from the person 23.7 *37.8 
Threats 15.0 *38.9 
Unweighted base 35147 441 
Incident type   
Series 34.8 *50.2 
Single 65.2 *49.8 
Unweighted base 35147 441 
One incident or two or more separate incidents 
for the same victim   




1 55.3               *85.7 
2 or more 44.7              *14.3 
Unweighted base 35147 441 
Emotional reactions   
Yes 85.1 *91.8 
No  14.9 *8.2 
Unweighted base 35140 441 
How much affected   
Very much 19.4 *39.0 
Quite a  lot 30.4   33.5 
A little 50.2              *27.5 
Unweighted base 29871 407 
Types of emotional reactions   
Externalized  44.9 *23.7 
Internalized 10.8 *18.5 
Syndrome of externalized & internalized 29.3 *49.6 
No reaction 15.0  *8.2 
Unweighted base 34845 440 
 
 
Source: Crime Survey of England and Wales, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12 
Variables: offence (recoded), pincid, emotreac (recoded to exclude ‘Don’t know’/refused), howaff1 
(recoded to exclude ‘Don’t know’/refused), NMatch (Constructed variable that aggregates discrete 
incidents for each victim for each category of racemot Yes/No), (recoded to exclude ‘Don’t 
know’/refused), whemota-whemoti (recoded to create the types of emotional reactions groups) 
*p ˂ 0.05 






















One incident or 
two or more 
separate incidents 
for the same 
victim 
Externalised Male 16-29 White   
 
Property 
crime Single One 




threats  2 or more 
 
Both externalised and 












Table 6.  Explanatory factors associated with the reporting of externalised reactions to 
incidents of crime believed by victims to have been racially motivated 
 
Dependent variable: Incidents for which respondents reported experiencing anger or annoyance (or 









Constant -3.79 0.45 0.000 0.02  
      
Sex      
Female      
Male 1.13 0.20 0.000 3.10 2.08 - 4.63 
      
Age      
16-29 0.80 0.20 0.000 2.23 1.50 - 3.33 
30-59   0.000   
60+ 0.01 0.38 0.973 1.01 0.48 - 2.12 
      
Ethnic group      
White 0.55 0.18 0.003 1.73 1.21 - 2.46 
Non-White      
      
Total household income      
Less than £20,000   0.591   
£20,000 - £39.999 0.28 0.25 0.271 1.32 0.80 - 2.18 
£40,000 or more 0.31 0.27 0.239 1.37 0.81 - 2.30 




Not provided 0.21 0.24 0.388 1.23 0.77 - 1.98 
      
Respondent’s 
employment status 
     
Employed   0.113   
Unemployed -0.25 0.31 0.434 0.78 0.42 - 1.45 
Economically active 0.38 0.22 0.087 1.47 0.95 - 2.28 
      
Crime type      
Personal   0.002   
Threats 0.12 0.21 0.575 1.13 0.74 - 1.71 
Property 0.86 0.26 0.001 2.36 1.41 - 3.94 
      
Single or series      
Single 0.49 0.18 0.008 1.62 1.14 - 2.32 
Series      
      
One incident or two or 
more separate incidents 
for the same victim 
     
1 0.60 0.29 0.37 1.83 1.04 - 3.21 
2 or more      
      
Unweighted base 438     
 
Categories in italics were those used as reference categories. 
Where categories of variables are statistically significant at the 95% level (p ˂ 0.05) values are 
highlighted in bold. 





Table 7.  Explanatory factors associated with the reporting of internalised reactions to 
incidents of crime believed by victims to have been racially motivated 
 
Dependent variable: Incidents for which respondents reported experiencing any emotional reactions of 
(and any combination of) anxiety/panic attacks, crying/tears, depression, difficulty sleeping, fear, loss 









Constant -3.39 0.44 0.000 0.03  
      
Sex      
Female 0.80 0.21 0.000 2.22 1.48 - 3.32 
Male      
      
Age      
16-29   0.000   
30-59 1.14 0.23 0.000 3.13 1.98 - 4.95 
60+ 0.37 0.51 0.472 1.44 0.53 - 3.92 
      
Ethnic group      
White      
Non-White 0.12 0.20 0.546 1.13 0.76 - 1.66 
      
Total household income      
Less than £20,000   0.925   
£20,000 - £39.999 -0.16 0.28 0.566 0.85 0.50 - 1.46 




£40,000 or more -0.15 0.31 0.619 0.86 0.47 - 1.57 
Not provided -0.02 0.27 0.945 0.98 0.58 - 1.66 
      
Respondent’s 
employment status 
     
Employed   0.671   
Unemployed -0.18 0.42 0.664 0.83 0.37 - 1.89 
Economically active 0.16 0.24 0.512 1.17 0.73 - 1.89 
      
Crime type      
Personal 0.88 0.30 0.003 2.41 1.34 - 4.33 
Threats 0.95 0.28 0.001 2.58 1.50 - 4.44 
Property   0.002   
      
Single or series      
Single      
Series -0.32 0.20 0.114 0.73 0.49 - 1.08 
      
One incident or two or 
more separate incidents 
for the same victim 
     
1      
2 or more 1.22 0.25 0.000 3.37 2.05 - 5.54 
      
Unweighted base 438     
 
Categories in italics were those used as reference categories. 




Where categories of variables are statistically significant at the 95% level (p ≤ 0.05) values are 
highlighted in bold. 
  





Table 8.  Explanatory factors associated with the reporting of both externalised and 
internalised reactions to incidents of crime believed by victims to have been 
racially motivated 
 
Dependent variable: Incidents for which respondents reported experiencing any emotional reactions of 
(and any combination of) anger, annoyance, anxiety/panic attacks, crying/tears, depression, difficulty 









Constant -0.19 0.30 0.522 0.82  
      
Sex      
Female 0.45 0.16 0.006 1.56 1.14 - 2.14 
Male      
      
Age      
16-29   0.315   
30-59 -0.03 0.17 0.879 0.97 0.70 - 1.36 
60+ -0.53 0.36 0.138 0.59 0.29 - 1.19 
      
Ethnic group      
White      
Non-White 0.41 0.15 0.008 1.50 1.11 - 2.02 
      
Total household income      
Less than £20,000   0.001   




£20,000 - £39.999 -0.86 0.22 0.000 0.42 0.28 - 0.65 
£40,000 or more -0.09 0.22 0.694 0.92 0.59 - 1.42 
Not provided -0.19 0.20 0.359 0.83 0.56 - 1.24 
      
Respondent’s 
employment status 
     
Employed   0.032   
Unemployed 0.16 0.27 0.566 1.17 0.69 - 1.98 
Economically active -0.45 0.19 0.019 0.64 0.44 - 0.93 
      
Crime type      
Personal 0.03 0.22 0.874 1.04 0.67 - 1.59 
Threats -0.16 0.21 0.432 0.85 0.57 - 1.27 
Property   0.490   
      
Single or series      
Single      
Series 0.50 0.15 0.001 1.65 1.22 - 2.22 
      
One incident or two or 
more separate incidents 
for the same victim 
     
1      
2 or more -0.23 0.22 0.298 0.79 0.51 - 1.23 
      
Unweighted base 438     
Categories in italics were those used as reference categories. 




Where categories of variables are statistically significant at the 95% level (p ˂ 0.05) values are 
highlighted in bold. 
 
 
